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Abstract
Within the context of two sets of robotic experi-
ments we have performed, we examine some rep-
resentational and algorithmic issues that need to
be addressed in order to equip robots with the
capacity to imitate. We suggest that some of the
diculties might be eased by placing imitation
architectures within a wider social context.
Introduction
Robot designers are frequently faced with a problem
which could be seen as an instance of the Nature vs
Nurture debate, commonly found in the natural sci-
ences: while there seems to be a general consensus that
tabula rasa algorithms for robot learning are unlikely
to be successful, robot designers tend to agree that pre-
imposing their own perceptions on the robot's control
structure might prove counterproductive as they strive
toward more adaptive robots.
Recently, imitation, which is seen as an important
method of learning in the animal kingdom (Whiten and
Ham, 1992), has been proposed as a promising method
for a compromise between the two approaches. While
the robot architecture is designed in order to benet
from other agents' knowledge, this is done "from the
inside", i.e. the robot learns about the world based
on its own perceptions. Imitation can be used as a
guide [shaping process] for the robot during its social
development in human and robot societies.
The issues
Where do we start? We believe that in order for a
robot to be able to imitate, the following should be
taken into account:
 There are several dierent levels of imitation, which
do not necessary share the same underlying mech-
anisms. We see at least three levels:
(A) Basic imitation as reproduction of the perceived
stimulus, for example, imitation of body move-
ments or speech sounds.
(B) Functional imitation, for example picking-up
an object, moving towards a door, making a sound
to scare o a predator, etc. Essentially, in this
level, its not the exact stimulus that is being im-
itated but rather the eect that it has.
(C) Abstract imitation or social attunement, i.e.
imitation not of the external action but of the pre-
sumed internal state of the partner (for example,
making a sad face when another one is crying,
smiling when others laugh).
A mechanism is needed to dynamically select the
level that the robot should imitate according to the
current social conditions and its own current needs
and purposes (depending on whether imitation is
currently a game, or a method of cutting down a
search space, or a method for achieving social ac-
ceptance, among others). Imitation might not be
possible at all levels at all times (unless elements
of prediction are incorporated in the architecture),
since frequently the purpose of an action might not
be apparent at its onset.
 The robot should have a concept of its own body
and of the body of the agent it is trying to imitate.
These robot body images do not necessarily need
to be designed in, and can be learned. We envisage
that the two body images and their development will
be closely linked (if not being instances of the same
body schema), and in our work (Demiris and Hayes,
1996) we have suggested that this might be done in
a distributed, topography-preserving way.
 Since the robot is perceiving its own body mainly
through proprioception (and frequently through vis-
ion), while it is perceiving the other agent's through
the external senses, there must exist a cross-modal
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matching mechanism that will perceive equival-
ences between the two modalities, and can translate
between the two.
 There are two dierent forms of learning associ-
ated with imitation: learning to imitate and learning
through imitation. In the former, the robot learns
what its motor system has to do in order to do what
the other agent is doing. In the latter, the robot
learns by imitating the other agent, and associating
perceptual experiences (environmental ones, and/or
own ones, such as emotions, biological feedback from
its own organism, among others) with this motor act.
Robot Imitation Examples
We have performed two series of robot imitation ex-
periments. One of them was performed on testbeds
involving dierent types of robot heads and a human
demonstrator (Demiris and Hayes, 1996; Demiris et al,
1997), where the experiments were aimed at examining
the issues involved in movement imitation. The other
series (Hayes and Demiris, 1994) involved two mobile
robots of dierent morphology, where the experiments
were aimed at examining the issues involved in learning
through movement imitation.
Movement Imitation
We are interested in understanding the mechanisms
underlying imitation of movements in 3D space, so
we engaged in a series of experiments involving a ro-
bot head imitating the head movements of a human
demonstrator. The demonstrator performs a series of
head movements positioned within the visual eld of
the robot head, and the robot imitates these move-
ments. The technical details of these experiments are
described in (Demiris and Hayes, 1996; Demiris et al,
1997); here we will focus on an issue particularly rel-
evant to our discussion: due to the experimental scen-
ario used, there will be dierent modalities involved
during the perception and the execution of a move-
ment pattern (the visual modality during perception
and the proprioceptive modality during execution).
This points out the necessity of designing a mechan-
ism for bridging the two. In humans, such mechanisms
have been hypothesised to exist at birth (Meltzo and
Moore, 1989), although several questions regarding the
specics of such mechanisms remain unresolved. For
example, is the information derived from one modality
transferred to the other one directly or is it stored in
some intermediate a-modal representation? The seg-
mentation of the input data (including the selection
of the level to imitate, mentioned earlier, which has
a strong inuence on how the incoming data will be
segmented) is one of the most dicult problems that
the robot controller designer is facing. However, the
study of imitation in natural systems is helping to re-
solve some of the diculties, by suggesting that the
generative system is actively involved in the recogni-
tion process. For example, recent neurophysiological
research (Rizzollati et al, 1996) has indicated a strong
link between the recognition and generation processes,
at the neuronal level, through the discovery of `mirror'
neurons in the premotor cortex of monkeys, which are
activated both during perceiving and executing cer-
tain actions. That means that the imitator's previous
bodily experience inuences the way it perceives the
demonstrator's actions. Apart from reiterating the fact
that past knowledge inuences the way that current in-
formation is processed, this work emphasizes the role
of embodiment in the way cognitive processes operate
(Dautenhahn, 1997; Mataric, 1996).
Learning through Movement Imitation
In this series of experiments, the purpose was to in-
vestigate how a robot can learn to negotiate the dif-
ferent types of corners in order to navigate through
a maze. While one agent is knowledgeable about the
task, the other is not, and is only equipped with the
ability to imitate (follow) the rst agent. The agents
are placed in a maze, the rst agent traverses the maze,
and the second one follows right behind, associating
the environmental states with the motor actions it is
performing due to its imitation of the teacher. We
will focus on a couple of important issues which are
relevant to our discussion here that were made evid-
ent during this work (interested readers are referred to
(Hayes and Demiris, 1994) for the details). These are
essentially linked with the temporal dimension of the
task. The rst one of them is when to imitate: it is
important for the imitator not to imitate the actions
of the demonstrator (such as turning left or right in a
corner) immediately, but rather when the imitator ac-
tually reaches that corner. The answer to this question
might be task-specic, which implies that the imitator
has to have some knowledge of the task in hand. The
second one is when to associate what you perceive with
what you do. Although some aspects of the answer to
this are also task-specic, a partial solution might be
given through the use of `novelty detectors', which link
the current action with previous knowledge that the
imitator might have.
Supporting the Imitation Process
Imitation is rarely a uni-directional activity, nor oc-
curs in the absence of other learning processes. In-
fants and young children, not only imitate their parents
and other peers, but are frequently imitated by them
(Meltzo, 1996), often engaging in mutual imitation
Preprint version; ﬁnal version available at www.aaai.org
AAAI Fall Symposium on Socially Intelligent Agents (1997), pp: 28-30
games. There is also a close link between imitation,
communication and cooperation (Klingspor, Demiris,
and Kaiser, 1997): not only imitation can be used as
a good way of developing communication (Billard and
Hayes, 1997), and equipping the imitator with enough
knowledge about a task so it can eventually engage
in cooperation with other agents, but, reversely, com-
munication can also help in the imitation process by
inuencing the way that the imitator understands the
task in hand, so an appropriate level of imitation can
be selected. For example, the imitator's action can be
monitored by the demonstrator who can give feedback
to the imitator on the quality of the imitation (provid-
ing the imitator with opportunities to learn how to
imitate), but also on two crucial aspects mentioned
above, when to imitate, and when to associate.
Learning by imitation is frequently combined with
other learning processes, in which case the imitation
process can help speeding them (e.g. (Schaal, to ap-
pear)). In addition, as we frequently mentioned in this
paper, the imitator's own knowledge and capabilities,
partially obtained by processes other than imitation
(including trial and error learning), inuence (hope-
fully facilitate) the way that the imitation process will
take place.
These suggest that placing imitation architectures
within a wider social learning context might help us
solve some of the dicult issues in robot imitation that
we outlined in this paper. If we want our robots to
achieve the degree of imitation displayed in natural so-
cieties, we have to provide the robots with comparable
levels of social support.
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Available Demonstrations and papers
Video clips and papers on this and related work can be
found at http: // www.dai.ed.ac.uk / students / johnde
/ research.html
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